Changelog

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All notable changes to this project are documented here. The format follows Keep a Changelog, and the project uses Semantic Versioning.

0.1.0 - 2026-11-09

The first release.

Added

  • Tspex.request/2: builds a TimeStampReq (RFC 3161, 2.4.1) for a binary, a stream or a ready digest, with SHA-224 to SHA-512 (SHA-1 only with allow_sha1: true), a policy, a random nonce, certReq and extensions. Tspex.decode_request/2 reads one back.
  • Tspex.decode_response/2 and Tspex.decode_token/2: read a TimeStampResp and a token (TSTInfo, with accuracy, ordering, tsa and extensions) without judging them.
  • Tspex.verify/3: verifies a response or a token against the request that asked for it, or against stored data, and returns what it proves in a Tspex.Verified. The certificate of the TSA is checked (signing certificate attribute, critical extKeyUsage with timeStamping, key usage), and its chain to the :trust roots is validated at the genTime, so a token outlives the certificate that signed it. Nonce, policy, tsa name, critical extensions, clock skew and a :revocation function are checked. Status and failInfo of a refusal are reported as errors. A token signed with SHA-1 (as the TSA of Apple and the LibreSSL of macOS do) is :weak_algorithm with detail: :sha1; allow_sha1: true accepts it.
  • Tspex.stamp/2: request, transport, response and verification in one call, with Tspex.HTTP, an HTTP/1.1 client with limits on the head, the body and the time, and a verified TLS connection; or your own :transport.
  • Time-stamps in CMS messages made with cmsex: Tspex.signature_imprint/3, Tspex.add_signature_time_stamp/4, Tspex.signature_time_stamps/3 and Tspex.verify_signature_time_stamps/3 (signature time-stamps, CAdES-T); Tspex.content_time_stamp_attribute/1 and Tspex.verify_content_time_stamp/3 (content time-stamps); Tspex.verify_signature_at_time_stamp/2, which verifies a signature and its certificate path as of the time of its stamp.
  • Tspex.path_validation_at/2, for validating a certificate path at a date.
  • Tested against openssl ts (OpenSSL 1.1.1 and 3.x, LibreSSL) and the Java jarsigner, both ways, with a negative corpus and fuzzing of every reader, including inputs that are not text where text is expected.
  • Tspex.TimeStampedData (RFC 5544, experimental): imprint/2, new/3, extension_imprint/2, extend/3, encode/1, decode/2, time_stamps/2 and verify/2. A document with a chain of time-stamps, each covering the element before it, with the MetaData under the first token when it is hash protected. The dataUri is never fetched; ersEvidence and other evidence are read and written, not verified.
  • TimeStampedData.verify/2 says in ordered whether the genTime of the tokens ever goes back along the chain, and :max_time_back refuses it (:time_order) when it goes back by more than the seconds you give.
  • The error reasons :content_missing, :unexpected_content and :time_order.
  • A tested recipe in the guide for :revocation from CRLs you hold, with the rules of RFC 3161, section 4 (key compromise voids every token; another reason only the tokens made at or after the revocation).